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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to perform a cost benefit analysis of the different options for connecting 
distributed generation (DG) customers in a specific constrained area (the March Grid), under the 
context of the Flexible Plug and Play trial. The study shows the importance of the development of 
levels of understanding and trust among the customers and suppliers of the system-level complexities 
of an interconnected grid that affect all involved, of the need to achieve acceptability for all involved 
and the development of a shared, confident forward awareness of future evolution capability, both 
technically and contractually. This research required a comprehensive revision of the current 
regulatory framework applied to DG and the search of the most recent estimations of generation 
costs with a focus on wind, solar PV and anaerobic digestion (AD) generators. Specific assumptions 
were made in terms of interruptible capacity quota, generation mix, embedded benefits, curtailment 
levels and load factors. The results are presented in four different scenarios. Two kinds of connection 
options have been assessed: smart option (non-firm or interruptible) and reinforcement option (firm). 
Results suggest that in general small wind generators will always have advantage over the large 
wind generators regardless the type of connection, solar PV would struggle to connect and AD 
generators would always connect.  
 
1 The authors wish to acknowledge the financial support of UK Power Networks via the Low Carbon Networks Fund’s 
Flexible Plug and Play Project and of an anonymous reviewer. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do 
not reflect the views of the EPRG or any other organisation that is also involved in the Flexible Plug and Play Low Carbon 
Networks (FPP) project. We are very grateful to Northern Powergrid, Scottish Power Distribution, Electricity North West 
and Western Power Distribution for the provision of relevant information and clarifications in the management of 
interruptible connections.  
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 
The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive has established specific energy targets for 2020 which have 
accelerated the connection of more renewable generation to the distribution network, which will 
contribute to achieving the UK’s energy security and carbon reduction objectives. It is expected that 
15% of the UK’s energy consumption will be from renewable sources by 2020.  The transition to low 
carbon networks requires the implementation of innovative technical solutions and commercial 
practices in order to meet the growing demand of electricity but also to avoid or reduce high 
investment costs that are borne by customers. The support of different initiatives that encourage 
the expansion of renewable distributed generation (DG) will contribute importantly to a smooth 
transition. Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) play an important role in this transition by 
facilitating the efficient integration of renewable generation to the distribution networks and by 
testing innovative connection models that involve smart technical solutions and novel commercial 
arrangements.    
 
In the context of the Flexible Plug and Play (FPP) trial, UK Power Networks is looking for different 
options for connecting more DG between Peterborough, March and Wisbech in Cambridgeshire. DG 
developers are seeking connections at constrained parts of the network that operates within this 
area. A total of six generators with total generating capacity of 26.2 MW are already engaged with 
the FPP trial (UK Power Networks, 2013). Connections in constrained areas increase the 
conventional connection costs which may jeopardise the project viability. Due to this fact, UK Power 
Networks has proposed the use of smart solutions (e.g. Active Network Management) and 
innovative commercial arrangements in order to be able to connect more DG in a cheaper and faster 
way. This approach requires the interruption of the generation output (non-firm connections) under 
specific rules known as “Principle of Access”. The method selected by UK Power Networks is pro rata 
where generators would be equally curtailed based on their proportion of total connected capacity. 
A capacity quota of 33.5 MW has been defined in order to limit the interruptible capacity and keep 
an acceptable curtailment level per generator (Baringa-UK Power Networks, 2013). A concern arises 
when the maximum quota for interruptible connections is reached. Under this scenario, it is 
important to make producers (already connected or new) aware about the way how the connection 
of new capacity would be controlled and managed. UK Power Networks has identified the different 
scenarios that would trigger network reinforcement. The offer letter sent to producers reflects the 
terms and conditions for connecting their respective projects to the distribution network. Producers 
are currently evaluating their offers and it is expected to have a decision from them in the following 
months. UK Power Networks has stated that they will continue issuing connection offers in the trial 
area throughout the life of the project.  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
EPRG 1320 
1.2 Non-firm (interruptible) connections2 versus firm connections 
 
DNOs are in the search of different options for realising and increasing capacity that allows the 
connection of more DG in a cost-efficient way. Based on the firmness of the connection, two 
schemes are identified: non-firm and firm connections. Under non-firm connection, the DNO does 
not guarantee the full export of the generation capacity to the distribution network. This means that 
in the presence of network constraints (e.g.  voltage and thermal constraints), the DNO reserves the 
right to reduce the generation output based on the terms and conditions set in the interruptible 
contract agreement. Sometimes, this kind of connection allows the producer to connect larger 
capacity in exchange for a reduction of the generation capacity during specific times. For instance, 
the financial viability of wind generators may not be negatively impacted if a curtailment request is 
made during summer nights, due to the low price of electricity (Liew and Strbac, 2002). On the other 
hand, a firm connection is the traditional connection, which allows the export of full generation 
capacity to the distribution network. The provision of this kind of connection may require the 
reinforcement of the distribution network in order to guarantee capacity. Following Boehme et al. 
(2010), the option of firm connection is more reasonable for non-variable energy sources due the 
sustainability of the maximum output for extended periods. In the case of variable energy sources 
such as wind, wave and tidal, the option of non-firm connections is more applicable to them due to 
the nature of these sources (i.e. unpredictability, intermittency). Contrary to firm connections, the 
nameplate capacity associated with non-firm connections is restricted.  
 
These two concepts are also frequently associated with the level of financial compensation that 
producers receive in case of network constraints. In contrast with generators with non-firm 
connection agreements, generators with firm connections are usually subject to compensation. In 
California, under the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM), Southern California Edison (SCE) 
compensates renewable generators that are connected to the distribution network except when the 
following conditions are simultaneously met: (1) the system operator (CAISO) does not award a 
schedule to SCE3, (2) the day ahead price is lower than zero and (3) the number of hours interrupted 
a year is lower than 50 (SCE, 2012). In GB, DG customers at high voltage (HV) or above that have 
signed a firm connection agreement receive a payment of £0.002/kW/hour when the distribution 
network is unavailable, except for planned outages (OFGEM, 2009). At transmission level, a similar 
practice is observed. National Grid (through Connect and Manage Scheme) and the Single Electricity 
Market Operator (SEMO) from Ireland and Northern Ireland compensate DG customers in the case 
of network constraints (DECC, 2010; SEM, 2011). The treatment of compensation for non-firm 
connections follows a similar pattern at the distribution and transmission level. In the case of Orkney 
ANM Project, Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution (SSEPD) does not provide 
compensation to renewable generators (Meeus et al., 2010). In addition, no market compensation is 
2 In this study the terms non-firm and interruptible connections are used interchangeably. There is no clear differentiation 
between these two terms. Based on the terminology used by some DNOs and System Operators, non-firm connections can 
be related to those connections that are managed actively, non-actively or those that are offered under fault based 
conditions. The term of interruptible connection (capacity) usually refers to a reduction of the maximum exporting capacity 
without specifying if they are actively or not actively managed.   
3 This refers to the schedule that the system operator (CAISO) awards to SCE as a result of a bid.  
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paid out by SEMO to wind generators due to curtailment or network constraints in tie-break 
situations4 (SEM, 2011).   
 
These two different schemes have pros and cons. In terms of pros, a non-firm connection allows the 
possibility of cheaper connection costs, avoidance of reinforcement costs, cheaper system charges 
(if applicable), faster connections and larger capacity connections. A firm connection increases the 
chance to guarantee future capacity requirements, guarantees the maximum export capacity (the 
probability of interruptions is much lower) and allows market compensation in the case of network 
constraints. However, a non-firm connection may affect the financial viability of the generator due 
to the interruptible capacity (no payments for energy not delivered and the loss of renewable 
subsidies) and due to the fact that they are not financially compensated.  A firm connection usually 
requires high connection and reinforcement costs (in case of network constraints), longer 
connection times (e.g. to build new infrastructure) and is subject to higher system charges in 
comparison with the non-firm connections.   From the previous comparisons, it is observed that both 
schemes have advantages and disadvantages and represent two different alternatives for DG 
connections that currently some DNOs are offering. The preference of either option will depend on 
the DG business model and also on the market and regulatory context. The combination of both 
schemes can be also an option.  
 
1.3 Our approach 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the different approaches that DNOs exercise for realising 
capacity and connecting more DG in a cost effective way; by opting for interruptible connections, 
firm connections or a combination of both. Specific case studies are analysed with a focus on UK 
Power Networks’ recent proposal for connecting more DG under the FPP trial, in order to identify 
the best practice and evaluate its applicability across DNOs taking into consideration the regulatory 
and market context. It is important to note that the UK Power Network’ case study refers to a 
specific constrained area of the March Grid with a particular network configuration. The paper is 
structured as follows. Section two discusses the network access regulation in the UK context with a 
focus on DG, including the new challenges that DNOs and DG will face in the context of the RIIO-ED1 
regulation. Section three explores the different practices that DNOs are applying for increasing DG 
capacity. Section four performs a cost benefit analysis presented in four different scenarios based on 
the solution proposed by UK Power Networks for increasing DG capacity in the constrained area of 
the March Grid. Section five sets the conclusions of this study.  
 
2. Access network regulation in the UK context  
 
This section describes the access network policies for DG in the UK context. A brief discussion of the 
current regulatory framework applicable to DG regarding connection costs and system charges, and 
incentives is given first. Additionally, it also provides a discussion of the future DG regulatory 
framework under the context of RIIO-ED1 and explains the new challenges that DNOs and DG 
customers will face.  
4 In Ireland the definition of curtailment and network constraints differs. Curtailment refers to a market and system 
operation issue while constraints are a network specific issue.   
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2.1 Connection costs and system charges   
 
DG customers that seek for a connection face two kinds of costs. The first one is the sole use asset 
and the second one (if reinforcement is needed) is a proportion of shared use assets up to one 
voltage level above point of connection. The remaining costs of reinforcement of shared use assets 
are incurred by Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges to customers. This kind of connection 
policy is classified as ‘shallowish’. The proportion of shared use assets that DG customers are subject 
to is determined by the cost apportionment rules defined in the Common Connection Charging 
Methodology (CCCM). The CCCM is part of the Statement of Methodology and Charges for 
Connection document that DNOs publish on their websites. Only generators connected at low 
voltage (LV) and high voltage (HV) are subject to the use of system charges under the CCCM. 
Generators whose plants are connected to extra high voltage (EHV) 5 are subject to the use of 
system charges under the Extra High Voltage Distribution Charging Methodology (EDCM). It is 
important to note that there is a possibility that a small generator can incur additional costs if the 
connection may have an impact on the National Electricity Transmission System. National Grid is 
responsible for assessing the need of reinforcing the transmission network as a result of the new 
distribution connection. This evaluation is made through the Statement of Works (SOW). The SOW is 
a study required by the DNOs to National Grid when they believe that the DG connection may have 
an impact on the transmission grid. 
 
In general, DG customers that seek a connection are subject to the use of system charges applied by 
the DNOs for the use of the distribution system. However, large generators with a generation 
license6 that wish to export to the GB Transmission system but who are not directly connected to 
this (classified as embedded generators) need to sign a Bilateral Embedded Generation Agreement 
(BEGA) and have to pay the use of system charges associated with the transmission system called 
Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges. The Statement of the Use of System Charging 
Methodology regarding the transmission system is published by NGET on its website. TNUoS charges 
depend on the geographic region and can be positive or negative. This agreement provides 
generators with Transmission Entry Capacity and also gives the right to generators to participate in 
the energy balancing market. By participating in the energy balancing market, generators can be 
charged by NGET through the Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges.   
 
The associated connection costs that the charging methodologies refer usually provide generators to 
a firm connection (after the respective reinforcement work in case of network constraints). 
However, cheaper connection costs could be offered to DG or demand in exchange of interruptible 
capacity (non-firm connections) or a delay in the electricity restoration. These kinds of arrangements 
are very specific and are usually linked to the trial of low carbon technologies and innovative 
commercial arrangements. Section 3 will discuss these kinds of initiatives in which some DNOs are 
taking part.    
   
 
 
5 LV: less than 1kV, HV: 1kV-22kV, EHV: above 22 kV (ENA, 2011) 
6 Only generators with an export capacity over 100 MW require a generation licence; generators with a capacity between 
50 and 100 MW may be given an exemption.  
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2.2 Incentives  
 
There are different initiatives that encourage the connection of renewable generation to the 
distribution networks. The most relevant for this study are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
a. Feed in Tariff (FIT): This scheme was introduced in 2010 and is focused on small renewable 
generation (no more than 5 MW). A guarantee price is provided to generators for a fixed 
period. There are two kinds of tariffs: the tariff for every kWh of electricity generated and 
the export tariff for every kWh of electricity exported (surplus energy) to the transmission 
network. The tariffs vary depending on the size of project, technology and date of 
installation. The technologies covered are solar photovoltaic (PV), wind turbines, water 
turbines, anaerobic digestion (biogas energy) and micro combined heat and power (micro-
CHP).    The tariffs are retail price index (RPI) linked7 and a regression of the tariffs by 5% p.a. 
is expected from April 2014 for new installations including hydro, wind and anaerobic 
digestion. In terms of solar PV, a system of quarterly tariff degression has applied from 1 
November 2012.  
 
b. Renewable Obligations (RO): This scheme was introduced in 2002 and represents the main 
financial support for renewable generation over 5 MW (and some projects between 50kW 
and 5 MW). Under this scheme, UK suppliers are required to purchase renewable obligation 
certificates (ROC) issued by accredited renewable generators in order to meet their 
obligations. If these obligations cannot be met, suppliers have the option to make a buy-out 
payment to cover the number of pending ROCs.  The number of ROCs for meeting these 
obligations is 0.206 ROCs per MWh (England, Scotland and Wales) and 0.097 ROCs per MWh 
in Northern Ireland for the 2013/14 period. The expected value of the buy-out payment is 
£42.02 per ROC for the same period (OFGEM, 2013a). Banding was introduced in 2009 in 
order to support generators based on the type of renewable technology. This scheme will 
close to new DG on 31 March 2017. Generators will continue to receive the financial support 
during the project lifetime (20 years). RO will close in 2037 and will be totally replaced by the 
new Contract for Difference Feed-in Tariff (CfD FIT) scheme. Under this approach 
compensation will be received when the market price is below the strike price or has to 
return the excess if the market price is above the strike price. CfD FIT will be introduced in 
2014 and generators will have the option to choose between RO and this scheme until 
March 2017. 
 
c. Levy Exemption Certificates (LEC): Introduced in April 2001. These are electronic certificates 
that are used to demonstrate the amount of electricity that has been generated and 
supplied to non-domestic customers (industrial and commercial supply). OFGEM is 
responsible for issuing the certificates to generators or suppliers (in case of Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligations – NFFO, or Scottish Renewables Obligations – SRO) and for accrediting qualifying 
renewable generators. Electricity suppliers negotiate the purchase of these certificates with 
renewable generators in order to claim for the Climate Change Levy (CCL) Exemption on 
7 Payments are guaranteed for 20 years after installation regarding solar PV, wind, hydro and anaerobic digestion and for 
10 years regarding micro CHP. 
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non-domestic supply.  CCL is a charge (tax) applicable to non-domestic supply of electricity in 
the UK regarding taxable commodities for lighting, heating and power by consumers (e.g. 
industry, commerce, agriculture, public administration and other services). The CCL was 
introduced in 2001. The CCL rate has been set at £5.24/MWh by period 2013/14 (subject to 
some exclusions, reduced rate and half rate suppliers).  
 
d. DG Incentives: This initiative was introduced at the beginning of the Distribution Price 
Control Review 4 (DPCR4). The aim of this initiative is to facilitate the DG connections by 
investing (DNOs) efficiently and economically. The incentive framework for DPCR5 (which 
runs from 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2015) allows DNOs to (1) recover the connection costs 
by 80% pass through – annuitized over 15 years, (2) get £1.00/kW/yr for first 15 years, (3) 
get an O&M allowance of £1.00/kW/yr, (4) get a network access rebate of £0.002/kW/hour, 
(5) set a cap and collar on DNO returns equal two times WACC and to the cost of debt 
respectively and (6) get a  high cost project threshold (for those projects that require 
reinforcement costs in excess of £200/kW). It is important to note that RIIO-ED1 has decided 
not to retain this scheme. Further details are explained in the next section. The principle of 
grandfathering will be applicable to DG incentives.  
 
e. Innovation Funding Initiative (IFI) and Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF): Introduced in 2005 
(DPCR4) and 2010 (DPCR5) respectively. IFI encourages DNOs to invest in research and 
development activities related to the technical development of the network. It allows DNOs 
to recover from customers a proportion of the expenditure from IFI eligible projects (up to 
0.5% of combined distribution network revenue) as follows: 80% in 2007/08, reducing in 5% 
steps to 70% in 2009/10. It was revised upwards to 80% in 2010/11 and will keep this value 
until 2014/15. Under LCNF DNOs receive support (up to £500m) for testing new 
technologies, operating and commercial arrangements which will contribute to the 
transition of low carbon economy. The LCNF is composed of two tiers: Tier 1 (which helped 
to the partial recovery of those expenditures incurred by DNOs on small scales projects and 
Tier 2 (which based on an annual competition provides up to £64m to DNOs to innovate 
projects). The last competition will be run in 2014. These two schemes will be replaced by 
the innovation stimulus package in the context of RIIO-ED1. Additional details are provided 
in the following section.  
 
2.3 RIIO-ED1  
 
The RIIO-ED1 model (Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs) is the first electricity distribution 
price control review that reflects the new regulatory framework adopted as a result of the RPI-X@20 
review. RIIO-ED1 has been set for an eight-year period (1 April 2015 to 31 March 2023). In 
comparison with DPCR5, this model provides strong incentives to DNOs in order to meet investment 
and innovation challenges to deliver a low carbon electricity sector at a lower cost to customers. 
RIIO-ED1 identifies a total of six primary output categories that would need to be delivered by DNOs 
during the price control period.  The categories are as follows: safety, environment, customer 
satisfaction, connections, social obligations, and reliability and availability. A set of incentives has 
been identified for each output category. These are in the form of financial rewards/penalties and 
reputational incentives. A range of secondary deliverables has also been established which allows to 
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monitor companies ‘performance and are leading indicators to ensure long-term delivery and value 
for money. It is important to note that there is no specific regulation for non-firm connections; in 
fact what RIIO-ED1 proposes is to encourage DNOs to develop networks that provide sufficient 
flexibility and capacity to the connection of new loads and generation, which may implicitly involve 
the practice of innovative commercial arrangements for managing interruptible connections.  
 
In terms of DG, RIIO-ED1 has proposed important changes that comprise incentives and mechanisms 
to incentivise DNOs to facilitate the connection of DG to the network. RIIO-ED1 will encourage the 
provision of good level of service, efficient investment, appropriate response to demand from DG 
customers, and the exercise of more innovate alternatives to traditional reinforcement (OFGEM, 
2013b). In contrast with the DPCR5, which proposed specific DG incentives described in section 2.3, 
RIIO-ED1 proposes a range of incentives and mechanisms that are part of different outputs. This 
section will discuss those related to connection costs, innovation, level of service and connection 
applications.  
 
2.3.1 Connection costs 
 
As mentioned before, in case of network reinforcement the proportion of shared use assets that is 
not funded by the DG customer is funded by the DUoS demand customers. Three elements related 
to the expenditure on network reinforcement to facilitate the DG connections have been identified.  
 
First, an ex-ante allowance for the efficient investment is needed to connect the projected DG 
connection requests (DNOs can retain up to 70% of any under spend and fund 70% of over spend 
against the allowance, customers fund the remaining 30%). The challenge that DNOs face is to 
provide a good forecast of future volumes of DG connections and their associated reinforcement 
costs which are partially funded by DUoS customers. DUoS charges represent 18% of an average 
household end electricity bill (Ward et al., 2012). The stakeholder engagement is seen as a key 
element to predict accurate and justified forecasts of DG connections. Stakeholder investment 
incentive is set at +0.5% of the base revenue. Due to the fact that future network reinforcement will 
involve traditional and smart network reinforcement, it would be interesting to analyse the trend of 
these expenditures over time. It is expected that the transition to low carbon networks will produce 
an increase in smart network reinforcement expenditure which at some point will exceed those 
expenditure associated with the traditional network reinforcement. In March 2013, Western Power 
Distribution (WDP, 2013) launched the RIIO-ED1 Business Plan Draft for consultation. The plan 
analyses the forecast expenditure that requires to be funded by DUoS.  Figures suggest that 
expenditure related to reinforcement for low carbon technologies exceeds that related to general 
network reinforcement in the last three price control periods with an average amount of £53m 
representing 52% of the total network reinforcement expenditure8. It also suggests that on average 
a total of £78.8m per year is expected to incur in reinforcing the network during the 2016-23 period 
where that related to low carbon technologies represent 36% of the total network reinforcement 
expenditure. Figure 1 illustrates the previous discussion.  
 
 
8 Costs related to network reinforcement represent 10% of the total core expenditure that amount to £6.6bn. 
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Figure 1: Expenditures on traditional network reinforcement and smart network reinforcement - WPD 
 
Second, RIIO-ED1 proposes to include actual expenditure on network reinforcement in the load 
related expenditure (LRE) reopener. The LRE reopener includes those additional costs incurred or 
forecasted to be incurred in order to accommodate changes in levels and patterns of network 
loading.   The reopener can be triggered by DNOs if they can demonstrate efficient expenditure over 
the whole RIIO-ED1 period is or will be over 20% of the ex-ante allowance. In addition, this 
expenditure (above the 20% threshold) must be at least 1% of average annual RIIO-ED1 base 
revenue. The inclusion of actual expenditure on network reinforcement in LRE will protect both 
DNOs and customers from uncertainty in the investment forecasts. The inclusion of this expenditure 
in the LRE will mitigate the risk of important changes on the volume of DG connections that DNOs 
have to facilitate. These changes can be originated for many reasons including policy changes and 
changes on DG implementation costs. In contrast with DPCR5, RIIO-ED1 considers two additional 
expenditure categories: secondary network new and modified connections (includes DG that is not 
connected to customer profile classes 1-49) and fault level reinforcement. The first one complements 
the expenditure categories already proposed under DPCR5 related to DG (OFGEM, 2013c). 
 
Third, RIIO-ED1 proposes the removal of the DG incentives and suggests that DG will be treated 
similar to demand. OFGEM believes that this new approach in comparison with DPCR5, will simplify 
the treatment of DG in the price control (OFGEM, 2013b). Under the current DG incentive scheme 
DNOs face a maximum of 20% of efficiency incentive of capex (80% of capex is passed through), 
however incentives on opex are not given.  In RIIO-ED1, DNOs will be incentivised on 100% of totex 
(opex+capex). This allows the equalisation of DNO incentives between capex and opex and promotes 
better investment decisions (DNOs have more alternatives). For instance, the implementation of low 
carbon networks can be encouraged in situations when opex rather than capex offers better value 
for money. The connections that require network upgrades may benefit from this reduction on 
expenditure in network reinforcement. DNOs are also encouraged to be more efficient due to the 
increase in the exposure of expenditure that they have to face. This efficiency can be transferred to 
DG and DUoS customers by offering cheaper and more innovative connections. 
  
9 These are represented by domestic and smaller commercial customers.  
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2.3.2 Innovation 
 
RIIO-ED1 proposes the removal of the LCNF and IFI which are part of the current price control. A new 
innovation stimulus will be adopted in April 2015. Except for any discretionary reward (applied only 
to LCNF projects), there will not be any overlap between LCNF and the new innovation stimulus. The 
innovation stimulus is composed of three components which are described in the following table: 
 
Table 1: Innovation Stimulus Components 
 
 
From Table 1 we observe that the three components of innovation stimulus are time-limited. The 
idea is to introduce the approach of innovation and to facilitate its implementation as part of 
business as usual. The funding related to NIC has been limited to £90m per year for the periods 
2015/16 and 2016/17. The funding cap for the rest of periods will be determined after conducting a 
learning review of the LCNF outcomes to take place in early 2016 (OFGEM, 2013b). An innovation 
strategy is required for the NIA. The amount to be awarded will depend on the quality and 
innovation of the innovation strategy. The default level has been set at 0.5% of base revenues. For 
instance, WPD has recently requested a NIC of 0.5%, which is £55m throughout the period (WPD, 
2013). The set of a proper threshold for each category of stimulus constitutes a key point. For 
instance, in the case of NIC, there is a risk of not selecting projects that provide value for customers’ 
money if a lower cap is proposed. By contrast, if the cap is higher than the total fund asked for 
projects that meet the evaluation criteria, there is not concern because OFGEM is not obligated to 
allocate the total funding available per year.    
 
2.3.3 Level of service 
 
There is a concern about the level of service provided to customers when seeking for connections, 
which continues to fall below the customers’ expectations (OFGEM, 2013b). In practice, DG 
customers (major connections) are more vulnerable because their requirements are usually more 
complex than those at lower voltages (minor connections). RIIO-ED1 has proposed a package of new 
incentives to promote improvements in the connection services. The one that is applicable to major 
connections customers is the Incentive on Connections Engagement (ICE). This incentive will 
encourage DNOs to provide a better level of service where there is not competition in the 
connection market to attend different behaviours. In addition, this will motivate DNOs to be more 
involved in the development of requirements that suit better for DG customers’ needs. In terms of 
Scope Name of incentive/metrics
Maximum 
reward (% of 
base revenue)
Maximum 
penalty (% of 
base revenue)
Major connections 
customers
Incentive on Connections 
Engagement (ICE) None Up to -0.9
All  connections 
customers
Guaranteed Standards of 
Performance (GSOP) - min. 
service level None
0/As per GSOP 
payment value
Major connections 
customers
BMCS - Complaints 
metrics 0 -0.5
BMCS - Stakeholder 
engagement +0.5 0
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rewards and penalties, the ICE does not allow any reward but a penalty of up to 0.9% of base 
revenue can be applied. Other initiatives that also encourage the improvement in the level of service 
and are applicable to DG customers are Guaranteed Standards of Performance (GSOP) and the 
Broad Measure of Customer Satisfaction (BMCS) which have been introduced before the RIIO-ED1. 
Table 2 illustrates the different incentives.  
 
Table 2: Incentives related to level of service for DG connections customers 
 
 
 
The GSOP sets the minimum levels of service that are required to be met by DNOs regarding 
reliability and time to connect new demand generation. The BMCS encourages the level of service by 
capturing and measuring customer contacts with their respective DNOs across a range of services 
and activities. Similar to the different innovation incentives, a key point is to determine the proper 
level of reward or penalty associated with each incentive/metric in order to encourage effectively 
improvements in the level of service provided by DNOs to DG customers.  
 
2.3.4 Connection applications 
 
The provision of quotations for connection applications can be importantly delayed by speculative 
connection applications which do not allow DNOs to provide better service to customers. The 
current regulation does not allow DNOs to charge customers for assessment and design (A&D) fees 
in advance of the formal acceptance of connection offer by the customer. Due to this fact, and under 
the context of RIIO-ED1, OFGEM is supporting the application to DECC in order to make the 
respective changes on the current regulation (Electricity Act 1989) that allows DNOs to charge for 
A&D upfront. The provision of relevant information to DG customers could also help to reduce the 
number of speculative connection applications and to improve the quality of evaluation performed 
by the DNOs when a connection is required. Among this information are interactive maps with data 
regarding availability of capacity, voltage level, constrained zones, others. For instance, Investor-
Owned Utility (IOU) such as Southern California Edison (SCE) provides in its website a link to 
download an interactive network map (on Google Earth) free of charge. This facility is mandatory for 
all IOUs in California (SCE, SDG&E, PG&E).  
 
Scope Name of incentive/metrics
Maximum 
reward (% of 
base revenue)
Maximum 
penalty (% of 
base revenue)
Major connections 
customers
Incentive on Connection 
Engagement (ICE) None Up to -0.9
All  connections 
customers
Guaranteed Standards of 
Performance (GSOP) - min. 
service level None
0/As per GSOP 
payment value
Major connections 
customers
BMCS - Complaints 
metrics 0 -0.5
BMCS - Stakeholder 
engagement +0.5 0
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3. Distribution network operators practices in connecting 
distributed generation  
 
This section will focus on a review of different practices applied by DNOs (apart from UK Power 
Networks) for increasing network capacity by offering non-firm connections or other innovative 
arrangements to DG customers. Our findings suggest that the offer of interruptible connections can 
be identified in two different situations: trials and business as usual practices.  
 
3.1 Trials 
 
Different DNOs and DG customers are encouraged to take part through the LCNF (Tier 2) or IFI 
incentives in which the use of smart solutions (technical and commercial) is normally proposed. 
Orkney ANM Project implemented by Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution (SSEPD) is 
the first smart project in UK that offered interruptible connections to DG customers. A capacity of 26 
MW has been enabled by the ANM scheme for the allocation of non-firm connections (classed as 
New Non-Firm Generation – NNFG) 10. Among other recent initiatives that are relevant to this study 
are Capacity to Customers (C2C), Project FALCON and Accelerating Renewable Connections (ARC). All 
of them are funded by LCNF in the Second Tier competition. Table 3 summarises the initiatives that 
re discussed in this section.     
C2C is being implemented by Electricity North West (ENW). The project is part of the 2011 Second 
Tier competition. It runs for three years starting in January 2012. The purpose of the project is to 
increase capacity by releasing capacity reserved for emergency use which requires network 
reconfiguration and the use of smart solutions. The potential customers are demand customers 
(industrial and commercial) and HV generators (DG). Cheaper connection costs (for new customers) 
or monthly payments (for existing customers) will be provided in exchange for allowing the DNO to 
manage the timing of re-energisation of the supply after a power cut (with a delay of up to 8 hours). 
ENW will provide two connection quotas to new customers (interruptible and standard connection 
quota). Regarding existing customers, payments will depend on the selection of protected days, 
protected circuits and outage period. ENW has indicated that the conditions (to be specified in a 
constraint contract) for managing the output of HV generators are in an initial stage and that they 
are evaluating different scenarios of curtailment allocation methods and capacity quota.  
Project FALCON is led by Western Power Distribution (WPD). The project is part of the 2011 Second 
Tier competition and runs from December 2011 to September 2015. The aim of the project is to 
facilitate the integration of low carbon technologies by exploring different methods for delivering 
faster and cheaper connections on the HV network (11kV) and reducing traditional reinforcement. 
The target customers are demand customers and DG customers. In order to address network 
constraints, the project has proposed a set of technical and commercial intervention techniques. 
Among the technical interventions are the design and implementation of dynamic asset rating (for 
realising capacity), automated load transfer (that allows the redistribution of load at 11kV feeders), 
meshed networks (implementation and operation at 11kV) and energy storage (deployment of 
battery technologies).  
10 The capacity represents the maximum economically viable capacity under NNFG. .  
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Table 3: Summary of Projects 
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Commercial interventions are focused on DG and demand side management. WPD has stated that 
the specific conditions for managing constraints (such as the curtailment methodology and the 
determination of the interruptible capacity quota) applicable to DG customers are still under 
evaluation (as of mid-2013). One of the main outputs of the project is the Scenario Investment 
Model (SIM) which will be able to find optimal solutions for managing network constraints taking 
into account different factors such as costs, duration of implementation, impact on network 
performance and losses.       
ARC is being implemented by Scottish Power. This initiative is part of the 2012 Second Tier 
competition. The project runs from January 2013 to December 2016. The potential customers are 
those who are looking for a generation connection at the 11kV of 33kV level in the South and East of 
Edinburgh. Its main purpose is to explore different ways for releasing generation capacity within the 
distribution franchise area. One of the key areas of the project is the delivery of novel commercial 
arrangements by testing the Connect and Management approach, non-firm capacity connection 
agreements, minimum export capacity and tri-party agreements (between DNOs, generators and 
demand customers). The project proposes the use of ANM solutions for managing network 
configurations and the output of DG customers. In terms of the curtailment methodology, Scottish 
Power has indicated that LIFO is the preferred option among generators and it is the methodology 
that they are planning to implement. The selection of this methodology is supported by generators 
because this provides more certainty in the way how curtailment will be managed. In terms of the 
interruptible capacity quota, Scottish Power has stated that (as of mid-2013) they are still in the 
process of evaluating different approaches.  
3.2 Business as usual practice 
 
This scenario relates to a business as usual practice; however this option does not work 
symmetrically across all the DNOs. Some of these practices are indicated in their respective 
Statement of Use of System Charging. These are as follows: 
a. Western Power Distribution (WPD) provides network rebates for non-firm connections. The 
condition is set in the Statement of Use of System Charging11. The rebates are mainly applied 
to generators with EHV connections (energised after the 31st March 2005). In terms of non-
firm connections, rebates have to be agreed prior to connection and are subject to the 
baseline availability expected for the connection. Total rebates are limited to the amount 
paid in export of use of system charges (for a specific connection) in a year period. Even 
though there is the option of rebates for non-firm connections, WPD recommends firm 
connections for HV and EHV generators.  
 
b. In the case of ENW, the level of generation export capacity is managed in real time12. 
Generators can have both a firm and non-firm Authorised Supply Capacity (ASC). The non-
firm ASC is usually larger. A constraint policy (between 0 and 100%) is applied if customers 
11 See: http://www.westernpower.co.uk/docs/system-charges/Archived-charging-statements/CN-West-UoS-Methodology-
Statement-April-2010-W.aspx 
12 See: http://www.enwl.co.uk/about-us/long-term-development-statement/policies-and-technical-references/network-
management 
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export excess generation capacity to the network. Similar to Scottish Power, the Statement 
of Use of System Charging does not specify the option of interruptible connections.  
 
c. Scottish Power operates a number of technical solutions to constraint generation output in 
situations when the grid is not able to absorb the maximum export capacity. These solutions 
are especially applied to wind farms in Wales13.  The operation of these trials has been 
confirmed by Scottish Power, however there is no specific methodology for managing 
curtailment behind a constraint (e.g. such as LIFO or Pro-Rata). A revision of the Statement 
of Use of System Charging from Scottish Power suggests that the option of non-firm has not 
been contemplated.  
 
d. Northern Powergrid (NPG) in a Demand Side Management (DSM) context offers the option 
of interruptible connection for active network management purpose (other than planned or 
unplanned outages) in the Statement of Use of System Charging14. For those customers that 
enter into this scheme (DSM), a reduction in use of system charges is applicable. This 
reduction will be assessed on a site-specific basis by the NPG. This scheme is only applied to 
customers that are charging based on the EHC Distribution Charging Methodology (EDCM). 
In addition to this, NPG has indicated that the option of non-firm connection is also offered 
to DG customers, to all types of technologies. The methodology for managing the generation 
output in case of network constraints (capacity, amps, or voltage) is LIFO. There are no 
curtailment caps at the moment and DG customers make their own calculations taking in 
consideration the potential constrained effect on the commercial viability of their schemes. 
Compensation is not applicable because curtailment cap has not been defined.  
 
Except for Orkney ANM Project, it is difficult to find on-going non-firm connection schemes across 
the different trials. DNOs are still discussing the technical and commercial conditions that allow the 
management of interruptible connections. Regarding the business as usual practice, the previous 
findings suggest that interruptible connections are offered across the four DNOs (to DG customers 
or/and demand customers), however DNOs do not publicly specify the terms and conditions for 
managing these kinds of connections.  
4. Cost benefit analysis of the preferred UK Power Networks 
FPP connection proposal  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the benefits and costs under different scenarios of the UK 
Power Network’s offer to wind generation developers that required a connection within the FPP trial 
area. The introduction of solar PV and anaerobic digestion generators within this area has been also 
13 See: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/scotti
shpower.pdf 
14 See: http://www.northernpowergrid.com/som_download.cfm?t=media:documentmedia&i=1001&p=file 
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assessed. We believe that results from this analysis may be extrapolated to other DNOs that are 
facing a similar situation of network constraints. 
 
UK Power Networks has proposed to different developers a variation of their existing connection 
offer which requires them to manage the output of generators under an ANM scheme15 in the 
constrained trial area (March Grid). The constrained area is driven by the excessive reverse power 
that flows on the existing 45 MVA transformers and only interruptible connections are now possible 
in this area. Generators have been informed of the maximum expected curtailed energy, the 
associated connection costs (FPP connection costs) and reinforcement costs (FPP reinforcement 
costs) in case of seeking for a firm connection. The maximum percentage of curtailed energy is 
constant across generators and has been estimated in 5.33% with an average reduction of 1.6% 
percentage points of the generators’ capacity factor (set at 30% for wind generation) with a total of 
11.853 MW of micro PV (outside of ANM control). This represents average curtailment over the 
year. It was assumed that demand is fixed and that there are no network upgrades during the 
project lifetime. The interruptible capacity quota has been fixed at 33.5 MW (Baringa-UK Power 
Networks, 2012). The results are presented in four different scenarios. Except for one scenario, it has 
been assumed that reinforcement costs are going to be paid only by generators (no use of system 
assets). Finally, this study also involves a sensitivity analysis exercise in which different demand 
growth scenarios are simulated.      
 
4.2 Data collection and assumptions  
 
Data have been collected from different sources such as OFGEM, DECC, UK Power Networks, Baringa 
and others. All figures have been adjusted to 2012 prices. The lifetime of the projects has been 
estimated in 20 years (2014 is the starting year). Some of the assumptions made in this study are 
based on those proposed by Baringa in the Reinforcement quota calculation for March Grid Report 
(Baringa-UK Power Networks, 2013). In general, it has been assumed that demand remains fixed 
over the project lifetime. This means that the size of installed capacity is the same at the beginning 
and at the end of the project lifetime. Carbon emission savings generated by the renewable projects 
under the four proposed scenarios have not been estimated because it is assumed that government 
support schemes (such as FIT and ROC) already include these benefits in their respective rates. The 
following subsections present the variables that are involved in the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and 
provide details about data collection, assumptions, formulas and values. Appendix 1 shows the lists 
of variables, formulas and assumptions.  
 
4.2.1 Generation and connection Costs  
 
Generation costs are composed of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and operating expenditures (OPEX). 
Generation costs related to wind and anaerobic digestion CHP (AD CHP) generation were obtained 
from DECC (2012b). The following table summarises the generation costs by type of technology and 
size of installed capacity projected to 2014 (2012 prices).  
 
15 FPP customers received the connection offer on 1 March 2013. The offer includes: (1) interruptible connection 
agreement template, (2) briefing document that explains the rules of FPP and calculation of the capacity quota and (3) 
curtailment estimates for now and worst case scenario.   
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Table 4: Generation Costs 
 
 
These cost assumptions have been used in the most recent Renewables Obligation Banding Review 
Analysis (period 2013/17). There are three project cost ranges: high, median and low for different 
groups of installed capacity for each renewable technology. For the CBA, low figures instead of 
median figures have been used16. CAPEX include construction and predevelopment costs and it is 
assumed that for future projections the steel prices remain constant in real terms. OPEX have been 
disaggregated into fixed and variable costs. Insurance and connection and grid charges have been 
specified by separately. DECC provides CAPEX and OPEX data for selected years. The respective cost 
growth rates (capex, opex) computed between periods 2010 and 2030 were used as reference for 
cost projections. Regarding solar PV, generation costs were collected from DECC (2012a). This report 
presents the updated solar PV costs that have been used for modelling the UK Feed-In Tariff (FIT).  
Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) was appointed by DECC to elaborate this study.  Only one range of solar 
PV costs (capex, opex) is provided.  
 
It is noteworthy that fuel prices regarding AD CHP have not been included in the previous table. 
DECC has estimated them separately. The fuel cost figure is £ 18/MWh (DECC, 2011). This study 
assumes that this value will be constant (in real values) over the project lifetime. In terms of 
connection and reinforcement costs17, these have been estimated by UK Power Networks for 
specific customers that required connections within the trial area. Specific cost assumptions have 
been made in some scenarios when data were not available, especially for some additional wind 
farm connection costs (Scenario 2, 3 and 4) and for solar PV connection costs (Scenario 3). These 
assumptions are explained in section 4.3.   
 
4.2.2 Embedded benefits 
 
16 A review of different sources supports this preference. The average of the median figures estimated by DECC are still 
quite high (around 1,653 £/kW, 2011 prices). A different number of studies have estimated that CAPEX regarding wind 
generation developers are between 1,000 £/kW and 1,375 £/kW (Redpoint, 2009; Rubino, 2011). In addition, see report 
from Ecotricity at the Energy of Climate Change Committee (2012) report. Thus, based on this evidence, we find 
appropriate to select the low range of costs estimated by DECC. 
17 Reinforcement costs are £4.1m. These costs are associated with the replacement of specific transformers that will allow 
an increase in the system capacity (applicable to the March Grid constrained area) up to 90 MW.     
Generation Costs (2012 prices) Units Wind>5MW Wind<=5MW Anaerobic Digestion Solar PV (250-5000KW)
Year 2014 (AD CHP)
CAPEX £/KW 1,198.4               1,188.1            1,919.9                           1,053                                  
OPEX 
Fixed OPEX £/MW/y 30,456.4             25,376.4          363,062.4                      
Variable OPEX £/MWh 3.1                        3.1                    20
Insurance £/MW/y 6,375.5               5,437.8            57,924.4                         
Connection and grid charges £/MW/y 10,008.7             8,536.4            8,646.2                           
Marginal OPEX £/KW/y 22
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Embedded benefits refer to those costs that generators may save when they are directly connected 
to the distribution network instead of the transmission network. Suppliers that contract with 
distributed generators can also benefit from these avoided costs due to the less use of the national 
grid and also benefit by the reduction of distribution losses when enter into a connection agreement 
with a distributed generation customer. In general, the avoided costs are related to the TNUoS 
charges, to the BSUoS charges and to the transmission and distribution losses. This study considers 
six specific embedded benefits which have been already identified in Baringa-UK Power Networks 
(2013).  
 
The first two embedded benefits are related to the avoidance of balancing service costs by 
generators and suppliers in the same proportion (ratio BSUoS: 50:50). These have been classified as 
generator avoidance balancing charges and supplier avoidance balancing charges. BSUoS figures are 
represented by the average of the last three year’ annual BSUoS charges. The estimated benefit 
value is the same for each party and is £1.348/MWh (net of Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow 
– RCRC18). The following two embedded benefits are related to the avoidance of transmission losses. 
In this case, the ratio is 45% for generators and 55% for suppliers (further details are provided in 
section 4.2.3). These two benefits are classified as: generator transmission loss reduction and 
supplier transmission loss reduction. The first one is computed by the product of the respective 
transmission loss ratio, the average transmission losses and the wholesale electricity gate price. The 
estimation of the second one is very similar but considers the National Balance Point (NBP) 
electricity price instead19. Embedded benefits from the distribution losses are represented by the 
product of the time weighted average of UK Power Networks Losses (see section 4.2.3 for further 
details) and the NBP electricity price. Generators can also benefit from negative DUoS (they are paid 
to use the network). The value of £0.51/MWh has been taken based on the estimations made by 
Baringa-UK Power Networks (2013). In agreement with Baringa-UK Power Networks (2013), we have 
assumed that due to the intermittency of the FPP generators, there are no TNUoS benefits (no triad 
benefits). Appendix 1 illustrates the formulas for computing the embedded benefits.   
4.2.3 Transmission and distribution losses 
 
Following the Balancing Settlement Code (BSC), the ratio of transmission losses is allocated as 
follows: 45% to non-interconnector BM Units in Delivering Trading Units (generator’s share) and 55% 
to non- interconnector BM Units in Offtaking Trading Units (supplier’s share). Based on Elexon 
(2012) the current average of transmission losses has been estimated at 2%. Line Loss Factor (LFF) 
accounts for the distribution losses and are estimated by DNOs using a generic method (usually for 
LV and HV networks) or a site specific method (usually for EHV networks). Similar to Baringa-UK 
Power Networks (2013), we have used the time weighted average of UK Power Network’s LLF value 
for HV networks based on the values suggested in the Use of System Charging Statement for Easter 
Power Networks effective from 1st April 2013. This value is 4.9% for period 5 (all year) 
 
18 See the following link for the BSUoS and RCRC costs historical data respectively: 
http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Balancing/bsuos/sfpricescharges/. 
https://www.elexonportal.co.uk/news/latest?cachebust=71bh7gzck9. RCRC represents the payment/charge that is 
redistributed amongst all BSC parties in proportion to their volume of credit energy. 
19 𝑁𝐵𝑃 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝐵𝑆𝑈𝑜𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠.  
18 
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4.2.4 Revenues  
 
Generator’s revenues are represented by the market revenue for sales of electricity and the value of 
incentives such as FIT, ROCs and LECs, if they are not curtailed. The wholesale electricity price 
projections that this study makes use have been estimated by Baringa (based on the Redpoint 
Energy’s GB Power Market Report). The estimations made specific assumptions regarding GDP and 
demand, oil prices, gas prices, coal prices and EUA prices. In terms of incentives, FIT were taken from 
the OFGEM’s FIT rates report applied to the period 01 April 2013 to 31 March 2014 for wind 
generation, 30 September 2011 to 31 March 2014 for AD, and 1 May 2013 to 30 June 2013 for solar 
PV installations. ROC data (buyout price) for wind installations have been collected from the OFGEM 
report: The Renewables Obligation buyout price and mutualisation ceiling 2013/14 (OFGEM, 2013a). 
Total ROC revenue is composed of the buyout price plus the value of recycled revenue. Similar to the 
exercise made by Baringa -UK Power Networks (2013), the recycle revenue value (recycle price) has 
been estimated at 10% of the buyout price. ROC Banding data for wind installations were collected 
from DECC (2012b). This study refers to the renewable obligation banding review for the period 
2013/17. In terms of LEC prices, we have used the estimations made by Baringa (Redpoint’s 
Reference Case Study) across the project lifetime.   
 
4.2.5 Load factors 
 
Load factors depend on the type of technology. A load factor of 30% is suggested for wind 
generation (based on the wind capacity factor recommended in the evaluation of non-firm 
generation curtailment at March Grid, performed by SmarterGrid Solutions - SGS). For solar PV 
installations the load factor is represented by the average of the last two years estimated by DECC 
(period 2012/13 and 2013/14). This average is 9.7%. Generation and capacity actuals (from Digest of 
UK Energy Statistics and ROC register) have been considered for the estimation of load factors. 
Regarding AD CHP, we have used the value estimated by Pöyry (2013) in the most recent updated 
modelling for renewable obligation banding - this value has been estimated at 84%.  
 
4.2.6 Financial ratio assumptions 
 
This study suggests a discount rate of 10%. This value is in line with that set by Baringa-UK Power 
Networks (2013) and with the rate applied by DECC for the calculation of renewable levelised costs 
(DECC, 2012b, Annex D) related to the levels of banded support under the Renewable Obligation for 
the period 2013/17. The corporate tax for the period 2014 has been set in 21% and will remain 
constant over the project lifetime. This value is in line with the UK corporation main rate to be 
applied in that year.  
 
4.2.7 Power purchase agreement  
 
Figures such as wholesale electricity, embedded benefits and incentives (ROC, LEC), are subject to 
power purchase agreements. We have applied the same rates proposed by Baringa-UK Power 
Networks (2013) that were used to determine the reinforcement quota calculation for March Grid. 
These values are as follows: wholesale electricity price and LEC (85%), ROC (90%) and embedded 
benefits (50%).   
19 
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4.3 Cost benefit analysis 
 
As previously mentioned, four scenarios have been proposed, see Table 5. All scenarios assume a 
fixed demand and the first three scenarios assume only one level of curtailment across the project 
lifetime in case of non-firm connections (set at 0.33% with a total interruptible capacity of 18 MW or 
5.33% with full non-firm capacity quota). Scenario 3 is the only one which includes solar PV and AD 
CHP generators. In the rest of the scenarios a 100% wind generation mix has been assumed. In 
addition, the first three scenarios are scenarios where the option of network upgrade has not been 
contemplated over the project lifetime. The last scenario (Scenario 4) reflects a more dynamic 
situation where network upgrade is considered as an option by 2019/2020. The upgrade would allow 
to increase the system capacity (from 33.5 to 90 MW) to its maximum limit and to offer firm 
connection agreements to all generators by 2019/2020. Scenario 4 assesses the project NPV under 
both situations of network upgrades (in 2019 and 2020) and evaluates the value of accelerating the 
connection of the additional 56.5 MW by comparing the NPV of the projects considering the 
network upgrade in 2020 and 2019. The following table summarises the previous explanation.  
 
Table 5: Scenarios 
 
 
From the previous table it is noticed that even though the maximum firm capacity available is 90 
MW after the respective network reinforcement, we observe that for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 only 
partial firm capacity has been assumed in order to make comparisons with the option of full non-
firm capacity (up to 33.5 MW). Scenario 4 is the only one which considers the possibility to contract 
100% of firm capacity (up to 90 MW).  Each scenario evaluates the costs and benefits for smart and 
reinforcement connection options. The smart connection refers to the non-firm or interruptible 
connection offered to generators under the FPP scheme.  The reinforcement alternative refers to a 
firm connection offer, which involves two kinds of costs: FPP connection costs and FPP 
reinforcement costs. Cost figures are represented by generation costs, connection costs and 
reinforcement costs20 (in case of firm connections). Benefits are represented by electricity revenues, 
incentives (FIT, ROC, LEC) and embedded benefits. The net present value of each project is 
20 Generation costs depend on the type of technology and are composed of capex, opex and fuel costs in the case of AD 
CHP generation. Connection costs are those related to the FPP connection offer (to contract non-firm/interruptible 
capacity) prepared by UK Power Network, which includes contestable and non-contestable associated works. Connection 
costs regarding the first five wind farms from each scenario refer to real cost figures which have already been offered by 
UK Power Networks to different wind farms. For the rest of wind generators, we use these costs as reference in order to 
estimate the respective connection costs.  Reinforcement costs (or FPP reinforcement costs) which amount to £4.1m are 
expected to be shared across all generators proportionally to their respective nameplate capacity only in Scenario 1, 2 and 
3 and to be borne by demand in Scenario 4. Thus a generator that asks for a firm connection under the FPP scheme will be 
subject to FPP connection costs plus FPP reinforcement costs.  
Scenarios
full partial full partial wind solar PV AD CHP
Scenario 1 18 MW 18 MW 100%
Scenario 2 33.5 MW 33.5 MW 100%
Scenario 3 33.5 MW 33.5 MW 82.84% 13.43% 3.73%
Scenario 4 33.5 MW 90 MW 100%
1/ Due to the addition of 56.5 MW (33.5+56.5=90 MW) by 2019/2020. 
Non- firm capacity Firm capacity 1/ Generation Mix
20 
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calculated by the difference between total benefits and costs (discounted at 10%) over the project 
lifetime. In addition, for each scenario total savings for selecting the smart connection option or the 
reinforcement option instead of the Business as Usual option – s16 have also been estimated21. 
Specific scenarios of demand growth and their effect on the project NPV for each scenario are also 
analysed. Finally, the impact that embedded benefits has on the project NPV is also evaluated. 
Specific assumptions have been made for each scenario. Appendix 2 summarises the specifications 
for each scenario.  
 
4.3.1 Scenario 1  
 
The aim of this scenario is to estimate the project NPV assuming a partial interruptible capacity 
quota. Based on the group of possible connected generators evaluated by SGS in the estimation of 
curtailed energy, five wind generators with a total installed capacity of 18 MW were selected. Taking 
into consideration the projections of annual energy estimated curtailment (per MW connected) 
made by SGS, the value of 0.33% was taken as reference (instead of the average 5.33%) to estimate 
the curtailed energy for each wind generator. Results suggest that in general the option of smart 
connection is financially more beneficial than the reinforcement alternative. In this case the project 
NPV is largely driven by reinforcement costs required for firm connections because these costs 
(£4.1m) have been fully allocated across the five generators. When the smart connection is chosen, 
Wind_D_5 and Wind_E_10 are those that benefit the most with an important increase in their 
respective project NPV. Curtailment costs under this scenario do not affect significantly the NPV of 
the projects because the percentage of curtailed energy is very low (0.33%). It is observed that 
under the option of reinforcement all generators, except for Wind_E_10, get a positive NPV. An 
explanation that supports this fact could be the high share of reinforcement costs that this wind 
generator is subject to, around 56%. Figure 2 presents the results including embedded benefits.  
 
Figure 2: Scenario 1 Results – With Embedded Benefits 
 
21  BAU offer refers to the s16 connection offer.  
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The exclusion of embedded benefits produces a different impact across the projects however the 
smart connection option is still the best option for wind generators. In general, the total project NPV 
decreases on average 20% (smart connection) and 48% (reinforcement option). Wind_E_10 is the 
most affected due to an important reduction of its NPV in both kinds of connection options. The 
least negatively affected are the smallest ones, Wind_A_0.5, Wind_B_1 and Wind_C_1.5.  Figure 3 
illustrates the project NPV across all generators without considering embedded benefits.  
 
Figure 3: Scenario 1 Results – Without Embedded Benefits 
 
In summary we can say that under Scenario 1: 
 
 Under the smart connection option most part of generators connect with total NPV equal to 
£5.6m (with embedded benefits). The exclusion of embedded benefits reduces the project 
NPV in 20%.   
 Under the reinforcement option 4 out of 5 wind generators connect with total NPV equal to 
£2.3m (with embedded benefits). A decrease of 48% is observed in the project NPV when 
embedded benefits are not taken into account.   
 The smart connection option is the best option in both cases with or without embedded 
benefits. This is explained due to the avoidance of high shared costs especially by large wind 
generators.  If the option of reinforcement is selected, a decrease of 59% and 73% of the 
project NPV is noticed, with or without embedded benefits respectively. 
 Total savings for selecting a smart connection offer (instead of the BAU offer) are £9.8m 
(£0.54m/MW).  
 Total savings for selecting a reinforcement connection offer (instead of the BAU offer) are 
£5.7m (£0.32m/MW).  
 
4.3.2 Scenario 2  
 
The purpose of this scenario is to evaluate the impact that a full interruptible capacity quota (33.5 
MW) has on the project NPV. The generation mix is 100% wind shared among seven generators. This 
scenario includes the five wind generators from Scenario 1 and two additional generators with 
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nameplate capacity of 7.2 and 8.3 MW (Wind_F_7.2, Wind_G_8.3). The average curtailment rate is 
the one that SGS has estimated (5.33%) when considering a full capacity quota. Cost data regarding 
these wind generators were estimated based on those costs from Wind_E_10, due to the similar 
nameplate capacity. Thus, a pro-rata approach was used for estimating these costs.  
 
In this scenario, small wind generators with nameplate capacity up to 1.5 MW would be more 
interested in the reinforcement option. This allows an increase in 5.3% (Wind_A_0.5), 4.3% 
(Wind_B_1) and 3.3% (Wind_C_1.5) in their respective NPV in comparison with the smart 
connection option. This is because small generators benefit from the sharing of reinforcement costs 
over 33.5 MW of total generation. For the rest of wind generators, the option of smart connection 
would be much more profitable. For instance, the project NPV related to Wind_E_10 would increase 
from £0.02m to £0.2m if the smart connection is selected. This fact is explained by the avoidance of 
reinforcement costs. Large generators are subject to a higher share. This also makes that the project 
NPV of this wind generator be positive when the reinforcement option is selected, in comparison 
with the previous scenario. We also observe the difference that exists between the total project NPV 
under the smart connection and the reinforcement option (£0.5m) in comparison with Scenario 1 
(£3.3m). This fact may be explained by the decrease in reinforcement costs due the lower share of 
costs that has been allocated to each wind generator (total reinforcement costs are shared across 
seven wind generators instead of five wind generators). The following figure illustrates the results.  
 
 
Figure 4: Scenario 2 Results - With Embedded Benefits 
 
When embedded benefits are excluded from the CBA, the reinforcement option is still the best 
option for the small wind generators (up to 1.5 MW). Large wind generators are the most affected 
due to negative NPV in both under the smart connection or reinforcement option. However, the 
selection of the reinforcement option produces higher losses to theses generators. Total project NPV 
decreases on average 45% (smart connection) and 53% (reinforcement option) when comparing 
with the previous results which include embedded benefits. Wind_E_10 is the most negatively 
affected with losses of £0.4m (smart connection) and £0.6m (reinforcement option).  The following 
figure depicts the results.  
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Figure 5:  Scenario 2 Results – Without Embedded Benefits 
 
In summary we can say that under Scenario 2: 
 
 Under the smart connection option all generators connect with total NPV equal to £4.4m 
(with embedded benefits).  The exclusion of embedded benefits reduces the project NPV in 
50%.   
 Under the reinforcement option all generators connect with total NPV equal to £3.9m (with 
embedded benefits).  A decrease of 53% is observed in the project NPV when embedded 
benefits are not taken into account.   
 The reinforcement connection option is the best option for small generators (up to 1.5 MW) 
in both cases including or excluding embedded benefits. Project NPV is higher due to lower 
share of costs.   
 The smart connection option is the best option for large generators (from 5 up to 10 MW) 
only when embedded benefits are taken into consideration. Project NPV is higher due to the 
avoidance of the high share of reinforcement costs. If embedded benefits are excluded, 
large generators are exposed to negative NPV regardless the type of connection option.  
 Total savings for selecting a smart connection offer (instead of the BAU offer) are £16.3m 
(£0.49m/MW).  
 Total savings for selecting a reinforcement connection offer under the FPP scheme (instead 
of the BAU offer) are £12.2m (£0.36m/MW).  
 
4.3.3 Scenario 3  
 
In this scenario, we want to understand to what extent the composition of the energy mix affects 
the project NPV. The energy mix is composed of wind, solar PV and AD CHP with full interruptible 
quota (33.5 MW). Five new generators were added in addition to the first six wind farms from 
Scenario 2, with nameplate capacity of 2.55, 4.5, 0.5, 0.5 and 0.25 MW respectively. Similar to the 
estimations made in Scenario 2, a curtailment rate of 5.33% was used as reference and the 
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connections costs regarding Wind_G-2.55 and Solar_A_4.5 were calculated based on the connection 
costs associated with generators with similar nameplate capacity (1.5 and 5 MW respectively). 
Connection costs regarding the three AD CHP generators were provided by UK Power Networks. 
 
Under this approach, small wind farms (up to 1.5 MW) and AD CHP generators would still be 
interested in negotiating a reinforcement connection agreement instead of a smart connection 
agreement. AD CHP_A_0.5 would get the maximum increase (around 28%) in its project NPV if the 
reinforcement option is selected instead of the smart connection option. The low share of 
reinforcement costs could explain the preference for small generators in deciding by the 
reinforcement option.  The Solar_A_4.5   generator presents a negative project NPV regardless the 
type of connection. A sensitive analysis that considers different levels of CAPEX reduction associated 
with the solar generator shows that even with a reduction of 30% in CAPEX, the project NPV is still 
negative (£1.1m for smart connections and £1.4 for reinforcement option). This result would suggest 
that solar PV generators are those that would benefit the least given the current assumptions. Large 
generators would prefer the smart connection option. In terms of AD CHP generators, the project 
NPV is moderately driven by fuel costs. A sensitive analysis indicates that if these costs are reduced 
by 30% (£12.6/MWh), the respective project NPV would increase importantly, by 32% (smart 
connection) and 26% (reinforcement option). We also observe that the introduction of solar PV and 
AD CHP generators produced a decrease in the total project NPV regardless the type of connection, 
in comparison with those figures from Scenario 2. The reason for this reduction is due to the 
negative NPV of the Solar_A_4.5 generator. Figure 6 shows these results. 
 
Figure 6: Scenario 3 Results - With Embedded Benefits 
 
 
The exclusion of embedded benefits affects negatively the total project NPV with a reduction of 50% 
(smart connection) and of 57% (reinforcement option). Small generators (up to 1.5 MW) have still a 
preference for the reinforcement option. The smart connection option would still be attractive to 
the rest of wind generators with capacity greater than 1.5 MW, excluding Wind E_10 and 
Wind_F_7.2. Solar_A_4.5 generator remains with a negative NPV. Figure 7 illustrates these results. 
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Figure 7: Scenario 3 Results - Without Embedded Benefits 
 
 
In summary we can say that under Scenario 3: 
 
 Under the smart connection option all generators (apart from Solar_A_4.5) connect with 
total NPV equal to £3.9m, including embedded benefits. If embedded benefits are excluded, 
not all generators connect (especially large wind generators) and total NPV decreases in 
50%.  
 Under the reinforcement option all generators connect (apart from Solar_A_4.5) with total 
NPV equal to £3.6m, taking into consideration embedded benefits. If these benefits are 
excluded, again not all generators connect (large wind generators) and a reduction of 57% in 
total NPV is observed.  
 Solar PV generator will not connect regardless the type of connection.   
 The reinforcement connection option is the best option for small generators (up to 1.5 MW) 
with or without embedded benefits.  Project NPV is higher due to lower share of costs.  
 The smart connection option is the best option for large generators (from 7.2 up to 10 MW) 
when embedded benefits are included. Project NPV is higher due to the avoidance of 
reinforcement costs. However, large generators get always a negative NPV if these benefits 
are excluded, regardless the type of connection.  
 Total savings for selecting a smart connection offer (instead of the BAU offer) are £22.3m 
(£0.7m/MW).  
 Total savings for selecting a reinforcement connection offer under the FPP scheme (instead 
of the BAU offer) are £18.3m (£0.5m/MW).  
 Project NPV regarding AD CHP generators is moderately affected by their respective fuel 
costs. A reduction of up to 30% of fuel costs would produce an increase in the project NPV 
up to 32% (smart connection) and 26% (reinforcement option)  
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4.3.4 Scenario 4  
 
This scenario is a variation of Scenario 2 and proposes a more dynamic approach. The purpose of 
this scenario is to evaluate how the project NPV is affected when considering in the medium term 
the option of full firm capacity (up to 90 MW) and to value the benefits of accelerating the 
connection of additional capacity by one year. Thus, this scenario contemplates the possibility of 
network upgrade (reinforcement) after five/six years of the beginning of operation. This is 
represented as follows:  
 
Figure 8: Installed capacity and curtailment level over time 
 
 
The assumptions made under this scenario are summarised as follows:  
 
a. A total of 20 wind generators are expected to be connected after 2019/20. Seven of these 
are connected by 2014 (which are the generators included in Scenario 2). The rest of 
generators (13 in total with an aggregated nameplate capacity of 56.5 MW) are additional 
wind generators that are identical to the previous seven (in terms of installed capacity and 
connection costs) and that will be connected in 2019/20. Appendix 2 shows these 
generators.   
b. Network upgrade allows to increase the installed capacity (up to 90 MW) and to provide 
firm connections to all wind generators. 
c. Network upgrade costs are fully covered by demand. 
d. Curtailed energy is set at 5.33% for the former seven wind generators from period 2014 to 
2019/20. After this, a firm connection is offered to all generators (20 in total), thus curtailed 
energy is 0% from period 2019/20 to 2034 (seven first generators) and from period 2019/20 
to 2039/40 (rest of generators).  
e. Incentives rates and bandings (FIT, ROC) remains the same in real values.  
f. The project NPV is assessed in two consecutive years in order to estimate the value of 
accelerating the connection of 56.5 MW by one year (and reach the maximum firm capacity 
equal to 90 MW). These years are 2019 and 2020. The difference of the project NPV under 
both years represents the value of accelerating these connections. Figure 8 explains the 
allocation of installed capacity and curtailment over the project lifetime.    
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The project NPV results (which include a network upgrade in 2019 and 2020) suggest that the 
project NPV associated with each generator in both situations are financially attractive to all of 
them. The sum of the project NPV related to the former seven generators represents 34% (with 
network upgrade in 2019) and 35% (with network upgrade in 2020) of the total project NPV. We 
observe that even though the second set of wind generators are similar to the former ones, their 
respective project NPV differ. For instance, small wind generators regarding the first group have a 
higher project NPV in comparison with those small wind generators from the second group. For 
example, if an upgrade is made in 2019, Wind_A_0.5 NPV would be £1m and Wind_H_0.5 NPV 
would be £0.7m, even though having the same installed capacity (0.5 MW). This fact can be 
explained by different reasons, among these are: (1) the time difference in getting connected 
(Wind_A_0.5 begins operation in 2014 while Wind_H_0.5 in 2019) and (2) the associated discount 
factors related to Wind_H_0.5 which are much lower on average during the project lifetime22.  
The difference between the total project NPV considering a network upgrade in 2019 and 2020 
respectively provides the value of accelerating the connection of additional capacity by one year. 
This value is £0.7m which means a ratio of £0.01m/MW. The following table shows the results. 
 
Table 6: Scenario 4 Results – With Embedded Benefits 
 
 
Similar to the previous scenarios, the impact that embedded benefits have on the project NPV is also 
evaluated. The following table shows the results.  
 
22 All figures are expressed in 2012 prices. Based on a discount rate of 10%, the discount factor for computing the project 
NPV applied by 2014 is 0.8264 and by 2019 is 0.5132.  
Generator Capacity Project NPV (£) Project NPV (£)
MW upgrade in 2019 upgrade in 2020
Wind_A_0.5 0.5 1,046,466             1,039,867           
Wind_B_1 1 847,827                 839,313               
Wind_C_1.5 1.5 1,618,790             1,606,019           
Wind_D_5 5 796,153                 769,592               
Wind_E_10 10 699,686                 649,531               
Wind_F_7.2 7.2 503,774                 467,662               
Wind_G_8.3 8.3 580,739                 539,111               
Sub total 6,093,436             5,911,095           
Wind_H_0.5 0.5 721,377                 661,883               
Wind_I_1 1 648,663                 601,865               
Wind_J_1.5 1.5 1,181,308             1,092,173           
Wind_K_5 5 1,016,967             985,373               
Wind_L_10 10 1,476,269             1,466,226           
Wind_M_7.2 7.2 1,061,378             1,054,286           
Wind_N_8.3 8.3 1,225,303             1,216,967           
Wind_O_0.5 0.5 721,377                 661,883               
Wind_P_1 1 648,663                 601,865               
Wind_Q_1.5 1.5 1,181,308             1,092,173           
Wind_R_5 5 1,016,967             985,373               
Wind_S_10 10 1,476,269             1,466,226           
Wind_T_5 5 1,016,967             985,373               
Sub total 13,392,815           12,871,667         
Total 19,486,250           18,782,763         
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Table 7:  Scenario 4 Results – Without Embedded Benefits 
 
 
The exclusion of embedded benefits in both situations of network upgrade makes the total project 
less profitable with a decrease of 22% in their respective project NPV. The value for accelerating the 
connection of additional capacity shows a reduction in comparison with the case in which embedded 
benefits are taking into account. This value is £0.5m with a ratio of £0.01m/MW.  
 
In summary we can say that under Scenario 4: 
 
 All generators connect by 2014 or 2019/20. All NPV figures are positive.   
 Small generators would prefer to be part of the first generation group (connected in 2014) 
due to the possibility of higher project NPV in comparison with those connected in the 
medium term (2019/20).   
 Total savings for selecting a smart connection offer (instead of the BAU offer) are £42.9m 
(£0.48m/MW).  
 The smart connection option with network upgrade in 2019 shows a project NPV equal to 
£19.5m including embedded benefits. A reduction of 22.3% is observed if embedded 
benefits are excluded.  
 The smart connection option with network upgrade in 2020 has a NPV=£18.8m considering 
embedded benefits. The project NPV decreases in 22.1% when embedded benefits are not 
taken into account.  
 The NPV of accelerating network capacity by one year is £0.7m with embedded benefits or 
£0.5m without these benefits.  
 
 
Generator Capacity Project NPV (£) Project NPV (£)
MW upgrade in 2019 upgrade in 2020
Wind_A_0.5 0.5 1,016,129             1,009,634           
Wind_B_1 1 787,153                 778,846               
Wind_C_1.5 1.5 1,527,779             1,515,318           
Wind_D_5 5 492,785                 467,256               
Wind_E_10 10 92,948                   44,859                 
Wind_F_7.2 7.2 66,923                   32,299                 
Wind_G_8.3 8.3 77,147                   37,233                 
Sub total 4,060,865             3,885,445           
Wind_H_0.5 0.5 700,869                 642,988               
Wind_I_1 1 607,646                 564,075               
Wind_J_1.5 1.5 1,119,782             1,035,488           
Wind_K_5 5 811,880                 796,422               
Wind_L_10 10 1,066,096             1,088,324           
Wind_M_7.2 7.2 766,053                 782,197               
Wind_N_8.3 8.3 884,860                 903,309               
Wind_O_0.5 0.5 700,869                 642,988               
Wind_P_1 1 607,646                 564,075               
Wind_Q_1.5 1.5 1,119,782             1,035,488           
Wind_R_5 5 811,880                 796,422               
Wind_S_10 10 1,066,096             1,088,324           
Wind_T_5 5 811,880                 796,422               
Sub total 11,075,340           10,736,521         
Total 15,136,204           14,621,966         
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4.3.5 Effect of demand growth on project NPV for scenarios 2 and 323 
 
A sensitivity analysis considering different scenarios of demand growth that produces a reduction in 
the generation output is evaluated. The scenarios are as follows:  
 
- Scenario A considers a demand growth that allows a reduction of 25% of the curtailed 
energy (25%*5.33%=4%).  
- Scenario B considers a demand growth that allows a reduction of 50% of the curtailed 
energy (50%*5.33%=2.66%).  
- Scenario C considers a demand growth that allows a reduction of 75% of the curtailed 
energy (25%*5.33%=1.33%).  
 
In relation to Scenario 2, a curtailment level of 4, 2.66 and 1.33% produces an increase of 17, 33 and 
50% of the project NPV respectively when embedded benefits are included. If embedded benefits 
are excluded, the increase would be 29, 58 and 87% respectively.  
 
Figure 9:  Effect of demand growth (NPV with embedded benefits, smart connection) – Scenario 2 
 
 
In Scenario 3, the effect of this reduction is more significant. The project NPV would increase in 20, 
40 and 60% respectively (including embedded benefits). The no consideration of these benefits 
would produce an upward trend of the project NPV with an increase of 38, 77 and 116% 
respectively. The following figure illustrates the effect of demand growth in the project NPV with 
embedded benefits.  
 
 
 
 
23 The effect on Scenario 1 has not been analysed due to the low level of curtailed energy (0.33%). Regarding Scenario 4, 
the option of non-firm connection is only allowed for a short period (5/6 years), thus we find convenient to exclude this 
from this evaluation.  
4.38
5.11
5.84
6.57
5.33%
4.00%
2.66%
1.33%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
 -
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
1 2 3 4
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t l
ev
el
N
PV
 (£
m
) 2
01
2 
pr
ic
es
Demand Scenarios
Total Project NPV (with embedded benefits) Curtailment
30 
 
                                                          
EPRG 1320 
Figure 10: Effect of demand growth (NPV with embedded benefits, smart connection) – Scenario 3 
 
 
From this analysis we can conclude that if demand grows up which produces a decrease on curtailed 
energy, project NPV increases importantly. This effect is more significant when embedded benefits 
are excluded. Additionally, lower curtailment levels reduce the value of firmness. Project NPV will 
increase if the level of output decreases, thus there is a point in which the value of a non-firm 
connection (smart option) exceeds the value of a firm connection (reinforcement option). For 
instance, in the case of Scenario 2 we observe an upward trend in the number of generators that 
would prefer the smart connection option when the level of curtailment decreases. Table 8 
illustrates this dynamic (green values indicate that the firm connection option would be preferred 
and red values indicate an opposite effect).  With a curtailment level of 1.33% all generators would 
select the smart connection option.  
 
Table 8: Effect of demand growth on project NPV across generators – Scenario 2 
 
 
 
A similar behaviour is observed in Scenario 3. In general, small generators (up to 0.5 MW) would 
prefer the option of firm connection. AD CHP generators would select the firm connection option 
even with a curtailment level as low as 2.66%. All generators would prefer the smart connection 
option if curtailment level is 1.33%.   
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Generator Capacity
(MW) Base - 5.33% 4.00% 2.66% 1.33%
Wind_A_0.5 0.5 52,299                26,581          863                24,855-            
Wind_B_1 1 32,837                659-                34,155-          67,651-            
Wind_C_1.5 1.5 49,256                988-                51,232-          101,477-          
Wind_D_5 5 81,104-                187,262-       293,420-        399,578-          
Wind_E_10 10 207,678-              408,626-       609,575-        810,523-          
Wind_F_7.2 7.2 149,528-              294,211-       438,894-        583,577-          
Wind_G_8.3 8.3 172,373-              339,160-       230,456-        672,734-          
Difference between firm and non-firm NPV 
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Table 9: Effect of demand growth on project NPV across generators – Scenario 3 
 
 
 
 
4.3.6 Distributional impact of embedded benefits  
 
A distributional impact regarding embedded benefits across generators suggests that embedded 
benefits related to distribution losses have the highest share (42.5%) and those related to the 
distribution use of system charges have the lowest share (6.5%). We also observe that suppliers are 
allocated with the most part of embedded benefits over the project lifetime (69%) and generators 
are allocated with the rest (31%). Thus, generators would take advantage of this by negotiating 
cheaper connection costs due the apparent imbalance in the shares of these benefits (between 
suppliers and generators). The difference in embedded benefits between non-firm and firm is more 
significant in Scenario 2 and 3 than in Scenario 1, due to the low curtailment rate assumed under 
non-firm connection (0.33%).  The distributional impact also suggests that generators with different 
technologies but the same nameplate capacity would show a dissimilar share of embedded benefits.  
This fact is explained by the different load factors that these technologies are subject (30% for wind, 
84% for AD CHP). It is expected that generators with the same nameplate capacity and load factors 
have a similar share of embedded benefits.  
5. Final remarks  
 
This study has assessed the different options that UK Power Networks has for connecting renewable 
capacity (interruptible or firm connection) to the distribution network in the constrained area of 
March Grid. This study is related to the business opportunities that DG customers could have in 
deciding between an interruptible or a firm connection. A cost benefit analysis (CBA) was performed 
taking into consideration the current regulation (subsidies and incentives), the maximum quota 
capacity for interruptible connection, the generation mix and profile, generation costs and revenues 
(including embedded benefits), and specific assumptions in terms of curtailment and load factors. A 
comprehensive review of the main incentives applied to DG and the search of the most recent 
Generator Capacity
(MW) Base - 5.33% 4.00% 2.66% 1.33%
Wind_A_0.5 0.5 52,299                26,581          863                24,855-            
Wind_B_1 1 32,837                659-                34,155-          67,651-            
Wind_C_1.5 1.5 49,256                988-                51,232-          101,477-          
Wind_D_5 5 81,104-                187,262-       293,420-        399,578-          
Wind_E_10 10 207,678-              408,626-       609,575-        810,523-          
Wind_F_7.2 7.2 149,528-              294,211-       438,894-        583,577-          
Wind_G_2.55 2.55 41,363-                95,504-          149,644-        203,785-          
Solar_A_4.5 4.5 292,464-              333,139-       373,813-        414,488-          
AD CHP_A_0.5 0.5 132,844              86,990          41,135          4,719-              
AD CHP_B_0.5 0.5 132,844              86,990          41,135          4,719-              
AD CHP_C_0.25 0.25 73,363                48,701          24,038          624-                  
Difference between firm and non-firm NPV 
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estimations of generation costs was conducted. In addition, the study also explores the different 
types of connection (e.g non-firm or firm) and the current initiatives from DNOs that allow 
interruptible connections. Both types of connection options have advantages and disadvantages and 
the selection of either connection option will depend on the DG business model and the market and 
regulatory context. In terms of the current initiatives that involve the offering of interruptible 
connections with smart solutions, the study shows that these are still in their initial stages across the 
DNOs. There is no clear evidence of the terms and conditions for managing this kind of connection 
being part of a business as usual offer. 
We aware that results from the CBA performed in this study may be subject to uncertainty due to 
some static assumptions related to generation mix (and the associated curtailment levels), timescale 
of network upgrades and demand growth. They also represent a conservative estimate of individual 
project value, based on the simultaneous connection of all other projects. In reality individual 
projects that connect early will have higher project NPV due to experiencing lower than modelled 
curtailment. 
Even though the study doesn’t specify nor quantify the benefits that DNOs could capture by 
connecting more DG in their respective networks, we believe that this first exercise is very useful to 
attract the attention of potential DG customers (especially those in the March Grid Area) searching 
for new business opportunities. This may contribute to acceleration of DG connection to the 
distribution grid which brings direct benefits for the society such as the achievement of renewable 
targets, avoidance/delay of network reinforcement, avoidance/reduction of system charges and 
reduction of technical losses.  
Results from the CBA suggest that under Scenario 1 the smart connection option (with or without 
embedded benefits) is financially more convenient than the reinforcement connection alternative 
(with or without embedded benefits) and the BAU option. This is explained by the avoidance of 
reinforcement costs, which were divided across the five generators. Large wind generators benefit 
the most due to the avoidance of the high share of reinforcement costs. In Scenario 2, small 
generators (up to 1.5 MW) would be more interested in the reinforcement option (with or without 
embedded benefits) than in the smart and BAU options. For generators with a nameplate capacity 
higher than 5 MW the smart connection option would be more profitable due to the avoidance of 
reinforcement costs, in both cases including of excluding embedded benefits. Results from Scenario 
3 also suggest that small generators will select the reinforcement option and that large generators 
will opt for the smart connection option. The modelled Solar PV generator got a negative NPV under 
both connection options, including or excluding embedded benefits, thus this generator will not 
connect. The project NPV of AD CHP generators are moderately affected by fuel prices however they 
still got a positive NPV, thus the three AD CHP generators will connect, being the reinforcement 
option the preferred one. In Scenario 4, the results indicate that the project NPV associated with 
each generator in both situations (with network upgrade in 2019 or 2020) is financially attractive to 
all of them. The value for accelerating the connection of additional capacity (56.5 MW) by one year 
has been estimated in £0.7m and in £0.5m when embedded benefits are excluded. The societal 
benefit would need to subtract the cost of advancing the additional capacity by one year.  
 
The effect of demand growth on project NPV for Scenario 2 and 3 has been also evaluated. The 
higher the demand the lower the level of curtailment. The study also demonstrates that lower 
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curtailment levels tend to reduce the value of firmness, being AD CHP generators the ones that are 
less affected. The CBA also evaluates the impact that embedded benefits have on the NPV project. 
The distributional impact shows that suppliers are those with the largest proportion of embedded 
benefits and generators with the lowest. This would increase the possibility for generators to 
negotiate cheaper connection costs.   
 
In summary, the natural selection of generators will depend on the connection offers that UK Power 
Networks have agreed and on the projections made for allocating more capacity in the trial area. 
However, based on our results, it seems to be that, in general, small wind generators will always 
have advantage over the larger generators (higher NPV/MW). In addition, solar PV generators would 
struggle to get a positive NPV over the project lifetime and AD CHP generators will connect without 
any concerns. The challenge for UK Power Networks is to find the best combination of wind 
generators (in terms of number of generators connected and allocated capacity), the right time to 
upgrade the network (triggered by generators or demand) and the right cost allocation across 
generators and suppliers in order to allow cheaper connection costs.  
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Appendix 1: List of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Value/Formula
Costs
CAPEX Depends on technology. It includes construction costs and predevelopment costs, see Table 4.
OPEX
Depends on technology. It includes fixed and variable opex, insurance, connection and grid charges, see 
Table 4.
Connection Costs Depends on type of generator and capacity connected, see Appendix 1. 
Reinforcement Costs Depends on type of generator and capacity connected, see Appendix 1. 
Embedded benefits
Generator avoidance balancing 
system charges
Generator transmission loss 
reduction
Supplier avoidance balancing 
system charges
Supplier transmission loss 
reduction
Distribution use of system 
charges (neg.)
Distribution line loss
Losses
Ratio generator 45%
Ratio supplier 55%
Average transmission losses 2% (current average based on Elexon's figures)
UKPN time weighted average LLF 4.90%
Revenues/Incentives
Wholesale Electricity £49.82/MWh (at gate, 2012). Based on Redpoint's Reference case (Jan. 2013)
FIT - Wind Wind 0.5= £180.4/MWh, Wind 1= Wind 1.5=£97.9/MWh, Wind 2.55=Wind 5= £41.5/MWh
FIT - Solar PV Solar PV 4.5= £68.5/MWh
FIT - AD AD 0.25=£151.6/MWh, AD 0.5=£140.2/MWh
ROC&Banding - Wind Buyout price: Wind 7.2=Wind 8.3=Wind 10=£40.71/MWh, Recycle price (10% buyout)=£4.07/MWh
Banding: Wind (0.9 ROC/MWh), ROC = (Buyout price+recycle price)*Banding
LEC Variable across the projects' lifetime (£5.09/MWh, 2012). Based on Redpoint's reference case (Jan. 2013)
Load Factor
Wind 30% (based on UK Power Networks' March Grid Case)
Solar PV 9.7% (average period 2012/13, 2013/14)
AD  CHP 84% (based on Pöyry's estimations, 2013)
Rates
Discount rate 10%
Corporate tax - 2014 onwards 21% (in line with the UK main rate corporation tax to be applied in 2014 )
RPI (2011-2012) 3.2%
Power Purchase Agreement 
Assumptions
Electricity 85%
ROC 90%
LEC 85%
Embedded benefits 50%
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Appendix 2: Scenario specifications (Scenario 1, 2 and 3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 1 
No Name
Nameplate 
capacity
Estimated uncurtailed 
generation - annual
Estimated 
curtailment - annual
BAU Connection 
Costs (s16 offer)
Connection 
Costs FPP
Reinforcement 
Costs FPP
MW MWh MWh £ £ £
1 Wind_A_0.5 0.5 1,314 4 1,900,000 234,779 113,889
2 Wind_B_1 1 2,628 9 2,000,000 384,711 227,778
3 Wind_C_1.5 1.5 3,942 13 1,900,000 157,137 341,667
4 Wind_D_5 5 13,140 43 1,200,000 649,788 1,138,889
5 Wind_E_10 10 26,280 86 4,800,000 590,817 2,277,778
18 47,304 154 11,800,000 2,017,232 4,100,000
Scenario 2 
No Name
Nameplate 
capacity
Estimated uncurtailed 
generation - annual
Estimated 
curtailment - annual
BAU Connection 
Costs (s16 offer)
Connection 
Costs FPP
Reinforcement 
Costs FPP
MW MWh MWh £ £ £
1 Wind_A_0.5 0.5 1,314 70 1,900,000 234,779 61,194
2 Wind_B_1 1 2,628 140 2,000,000 384,711 122,388
3 Wind_C_1.5 1.5 3,942 210 1,900,000 157,137 183,582
4 Wind_D_5 5 13,140 700 1,200,000 649,788 611,940
5 Wind_E_10 10 26,280 1,400 4,800,000 590,817 1,223,881
6 Wind_F_7.2 7.2 18,922 1,008 3,456,000 425,388 881,194
7 Wind_G_8.3 8.3 21,812 1,162 3,984,000 490,378 1,015,821
33.5 88,038 4,691 19,240,000 2,932,998 4,100,000
Scenario 3 
No Name
Nameplate 
capacity
Estimated uncurtailed 
generation - annual
Estimated 
curtailment - annual
BAU Connection 
Costs (s16 offer)
Connection 
Costs FPP
Reinforcement 
Costs FPP
MW MWh MWh £ £ £
1 Wind_A_0.5 0.5 1,314 70 1,900,000 234,779 61,194
2 Wind_B_1 1 2,628 140 2,000,000 384,711 122,388
3 Wind_C_1.5 1.5 3,942 210 1,900,000 157,137 183,582
4 Wind_D_5 5 13,140 700 1,200,000 649,788 611,940
5 Wind_E_10 10 26,280 1,400 4,800,000 590,817 1,223,881
6 Wind_F_7.2 7.2 18,922 1,008 3,456,000 425,388 881,194
7 Wind_G_2.55 2.55 6,701 357 3,230,000 267,133 312,090
8 Solar_A_4.5 4.5 3,824 204 1,080,000 584,809 550,746
9 AD CHP_A_0.5 0.5 3,679 196 1,900,000 350,000 61,194
10 AD CHP_B_0.5 0.5 3,679 196 2,500,000 100,000 61,194
11 AD CHP_C_0.25 0.25 1,840 98 2,205,750 117,450 30,597
33.5 85,949 4,580 26,171,750 3,862,012 4,100,000
38 
 
EPRG 1320 
Appendix 2: Scenario specification (Scenario 4)  
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